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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of changes in state prudent trust investment laws
on asset allocation in noncommercial trusts. The old prudent man rule favored
“safe” investments
such as government bonds and disfavored “speculation” in stock. The new prudent
investor rule, now widely adopted, relies on modern portfolio theory, freeing the
trustee to invest based on risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust
and in light of the composition of the trust portfolio as a whole. Using state- and
institution-level panel data from 1986-1997, we find that after a state’s adoption
of the new prudent investor rule, trust institutions held about 1.5 to 4.5 percentage
points more stock at the expense of “safe” investments.
Accordingly, we conclude that trustees are sensitive to changes in trust fiduciary
law. Even though trust investment laws are nominally default rules, such rules
matter in the presence of
agency costs and unreliable judicial enforcement of opt outs.
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This paper investigates the effect of changes in state prudent trust investment laws on 
asset allocation in noncommercial trusts.  The old prudent man rule favored “safe” invest-
ments such as government bonds and disfavored “speculation” in stock.  The new prudent in-
vestor rule, which draws on modern portfolio theory and is now widely adopted, frees the 
trustee to invest based on risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust and in light 
of the composition of the trust portfolio as a whole.  Using state- and institution-level panel 
data from 1986-1997, we find that after a state’s adoption of the new prudent investor rule, 
trust institutions held about 1.5 to 4.5 percentage points more stock at the expense of “safe” 
investments, which amounts to a 3 to 10 percent increase.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
trustees are sensitive to changes in trust fiduciary law.  Even though trust investment laws are 
nominally default rules, such rules matter in the presence of agency costs and unreliable judi-
cial enforcement of opt outs.   
   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“How do you make a small fortune?  Give a bank a large one to manage in trust.”1  
So goes an old saw about the banking industry that reflects long experience with risk-
averse, conservative trust investing by institutional trustees operating under the prudent 
man rule of trust investment law.  The prudent man rule favored “safe” investments such 
as government bonds, disfavored “speculation” in stock, and courts assessed the prudence 
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1 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1335 
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of each investment in isolation rather than in the context of the portfolio as a whole.  In 
the last twenty years, however, all states except Mississippi abandoned the old prudent 
man rule.  In its place the states have adopted the new prudent investor rule.  Drawing on 
the teachings of modern portfolio theory, the new prudent investor rule directs the trustee 
to invest based on risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust and instructs 
courts to review the prudence of individual investments in the context of the trust portfo-
lio as a whole.  The new prudent investor law thus abolishes all categorical restrictions on 
permissible types of investments.  Most importantly, it repudiates the former law’s hostil-
ity to investment in stock.   
The effects of this legal reform have been largely unstudied, but are potentially 
quite important.  State trust investment law governs the investment of substantial sums of 
money.  At year-end 2004, federally-reporting institutional trustees alone held roughly $1 
trillion in noncommercial trust funds.  Moreover, with the increasing use of perpetual 
trusts,2 and the rise of the inter vivos revocable trust as a will substitute,3 the volume of 
investment capital held by trustees is likely to grow at an increasingly rapid rate. 
The problem of how to regulate the trustee’s investment decisions is a specific 
manifestation of the more general agency problem that is inherent in the use of the trust 
form.  In legal terms, a trust is a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee holds legal 
title to specified property, entrusted to him by the settlor, and manages that property for 
the benefit of one or more beneficiaries.  Hence the trust separates risk-bearing (the bene-
ficiaries) and management (the trustee).   
                                                          
2 See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 Yale L.J. 356 (2005). 
3 See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1113 (1984). 
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To safeguard the beneficiary from mismanagement or misappropriation by the 
trustee, trust law supplies a set of default terms known as fiduciary duties that prescribe 
the trustee’s level of care (the duty of prudence) and proscribe misappropriation (the duty 
of loyalty).4  Such terms are enforced through ex post litigation.  Moreover, because trust 
default law makes it difficult for the beneficiary to remove the trustee, and because the 
beneficiary’s interest is typically inalienable (i.e., there is no market for trust control), the 
threat of fiduciary litigation is the primary force for minimizing agency costs in the mod-
ern trust relationship.5  With respect to managing the trust’s investment portfolio, unless 
the settlor provides otherwise, the trustee’s fiduciary duty of prudence is defined by the 
default law of trust investment. 
Default rules should only matter in the presence of transaction costs.  If the settlor 
can cheaply specify investment goals in the trust instrument, and the trustee’s compliance 
with those instructions is easily observed, we would expect the recent change in prudent 
trust investment standards to have had little effect on trust investment in practice.  Indeed, 
surveys conducted while the old rule was in effect suggest that such opt outs were com-
mon.6  Thus, scholars such as Jeffrey Gordon, John Langbein, and Richard Posner have 
                                                          
4 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 640-42, 655-
60 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & Econ. 425, 
426 (1993); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character 
and Legal Consequences, 66 NYU L. Rev. 1045, 1047 (1991). 
5 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. 565, 
570-71, 577-78 (2003). 
6 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 52, 76 n.99 (1987). 
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theorized that the old rule endured for so long in part because sophisticated parties could 
opt out of its application.7   
There are, however, good reasons to suppose that the underlying duty of prudence 
nonetheless influences trust investment in practice.  First, comprehensive opt outs are in-
feasible,8 which is to say that trust agreements are necessarily incomplete contracts for 
which the default fiduciary standards remain relevant.  Second, under the old law courts 
were skeptical of opt outs.  For example, even if the trust instrument authorized a specific 
investment, courts still reviewed whether exercising that authority was prudent under the 
circumstances.9  Third, the trustee’s litigation risk was asymmetric.  Under the old law 
the beneficiary had no viable cause of action for a too-conservative portfolio (government 
bonds were in effect per se prudent).10  By contrast, if an investment in stock did not pay 
off, in hindsight courts too often deemed such an investment to have been imprudent 
“speculation” regardless of whether it was a sensible investment ex ante in the context of 
the portfolio as a whole.  Finally, typical industry compensation arrangements, which are 
                                                          
7 See Gordon, supra note __, at 75-76; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and 
Trust-Investment Law, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1, 5-6; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 
§15.6, at 455 (6th ed. 2003).  In more recent work, however, Langbein predicted an increase in trust in-
vestment in equity following adoption of the new prudent investor rule.  See John H. Langbein, The Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641, 654 & n.83 (1996) (cit-
ing a statement by a leading New York bank to a similar effect). 
8 The condition of financial markets, the needs of the beneficiaries, and in many trusts the identity of 
the beneficiaries will vary over time.  Hence it is impossible for the donor to specify in advance what the 
trustee should do in all possible contingent future states of the world.   
9 See infra notes 26-28 and text accompanying.  The related phenomena of network effects, status quo 
bias, and agency costs and herd behavior in contract drafting further exacerbate the difficulty of opting out.  
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Re-
turns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash U.L.Q. 347, 353-65 (1996); Russell Korobkin, The 
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998). 
10 As Langbein put it, “under traditional law beneficiaries have had little recourse when trustee per-
formance has been indifferent, but not so egregious as to be in breach of trust.”  John H. Langbein, The 
Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int. 66, 76 (2001). 
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based on the total corpus of the trust and are one percent or less per annum, do little to 
offset the poor incentives of the trustee to invest otherwise than cautiously.11  Investing in 
stock or other securities with a higher risk/return tradeoff exposed the trustee to downside 
litigation risk with little potential upside gain.12   
In spite of the importance of trust investment law for capital markets, the efficient 
allocation of investment capital, and intergenerational wealth transfer, there is no pub-
lished study of the effect on trust investment practices of the change from the old prudent 
man rule to the new prudent investor rule.13  Using state- and bank-level panel data span-
                                                          
11 Often the purpose of the trust is to supply a reliable source of income to the surviving spouse and 
children, who have a low tolerance for risk, not to maximize the value of the trust corpus.  By contrast, an 
institutional trustee with a portfolio of trust funds under its management is likely to be risk-neutral, or at 
least less risk-averse than the beneficiaries.  For this reason, the benefits of trying to solve the incentive 
problem by setting the trustee’s compensation in relation to the trust’s annual return are typically out-
weighed by the costs of exacerbating the risk-sharing problem.  The fundamental difficulty is that the opti-
mal solution to the principal-agent problem with a risk-averse principal and a risk-neutral (or at least less 
risk-averse) agent, selling the project to the agent, is foreclosed by the transferor’s use of the trust form 
instead of an outright transfer.  On this account the settlor is the trustee’s primary principal.  See Robert H. 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 648-49 (2004).   
12 Judicial enforcement of the duty of prudence in trust law has traditionally been more searching and 
rigorous than the enforcement of the duty of care in corporate law.  Unlike trust beneficiaries, well-
diversified shareholders are risk-neutral.  For a comparison, see Rachlinksi, supra note __, at 78-79; Sit-
koff, supra note __, at 654-57.    
13 In a 1999 study, Begleiter surveyed 239 banking institutions in Iowa to inquire of their interpretation 
of the new Iowa prudent investor rule.  Of the 61 institutions replying, a substantial majority indicated that 
they employed risk/return analysis in making trust investments and that the new prudent investor rule did 
not flatly prohibit specific investments.  See Martin D. Beglieter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act—An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 Me. L. Rev. 27, 72-77, 
79-85 (1999).  Begleiter did not, however, undertake a before-and-after comparison. 
In a recent paper, Hankins et al. examine the effect of prudent trust investment laws on the preference 
for dividend-paying stocks among institutional investors such as insurance companies and bank trust de-
partments.  See Kristine Watson Hankins, Mark J. Flannery, and M. Nimalendron, “Fiduciary Standards 
and Institution’s Prefernece for Dividend-Paying Stock,” August 2005, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686966.  Based on SEC filings, they find that, between 1990 and 2000, such insti-
tutions increased their holdings in non-dividend paying stocks after a state’s adoption of a modern prudent 
investor law.  However, there are at least three potential problems with their analysis.  First, their sample 
data does not distinguish between actively-managed personal trusts, passively-managed personal trusts, 
ERISA benefit funds, and other such institutional funds.  But state prudent trust investment law is directly 
controlling only with respect to personal trusts.  Second, their identification strategy looks to the law of the 
institution’s top-level holding company’s state of incorporation, which is not necessarily the same state law 
that governs the administration of a trust fund held by a subsidiary of the holding company.  Third, state 
principal and income rules, which bear directly on preferences for dividend-paying stocks, became increas-
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ning 1986-1997 and a variety of identification strategies, we examine whether the asset 
allocation of noncommercial trust funds held by institutional trustees changed after a state 
repealed the old prudent man rule and adopted the new prudent investor law.  In the pe-
riod under study, 35 states adopted the new law.14  We find that after a state’s adoption of 
the new prudent investor rule, trust institutions held about 1.5 to 4.5 percentage points 
more stock at the expense of “safe” investments, which translates to roughly a 3 to 10 
percent increase in the percent of noncommercial trust assets invested in stock.  Accord-
ingly, we conclude that even though trust investment laws are nominally default rules, 
such rules matter in the presence of agency costs and unreliable judicial enforcement of 
opt outs.  Moreover, by showing that trustees are sensitive to changes in trust fiduciary 
law, our findings imply that the fiduciary obligation is a viable means of trust govern-
ance.  Our findings also bear on the appropriate measure of damages for breach of trust. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II motivates the em-
pirical analysis by reviewing the relevant law and prior literature.  Section III explains 
our research design, the nature of our dataset, and our identification strategies.  We report 
our results in Section IV.  Section V concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ingly differentiated after 1997 (see infra note 58 and text accompanying).  But Hankins et al. do not control 
for changes in state principal and income rules. By contrast, our data isolates actively-managed personal 
trust funds from other institutional holdings and it more closely aligns those funds with the applicable state 
law.  Moreover, we use ERISA funds, which are governed by federal law (not state trust law), as a control 
group in some specifications. 
14 Nine of those 35 repeals, however, came in 1997, the last year of the study.  See infra Table 5 and 
Figure 1.  
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II. THE LAW OF PRUDENT TRUST INVESTMENT 
A. The Constrained Prudent Man Rule 
In the aftermath of the “South Sea Bubble” of 1720, the English Court of Chan-
cery developed a “court-list” of permissible trust investments—typically government 
bonds and first mortgages on realty—that were presumptively prudent for trust invest-
ment.15  Investments not on the list were improper.  Eventually the court-lists were codi-
fied by statute, with some American states keeping their statutory lists well into the twen-
tieth century.16  Under this “legal list” approach, investment in corporate securities was 
forbidden or greatly restricted.17  
In 1830, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts initiated the move away 
from the legal lists and toward the “prudent man rule” in the famous case of Harvard 
College v. Amory.18  Amory admonishes trustees “to observe how men of prudence, dis-
cretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in re-
gard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well 
as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.”  With some nudging from the Ameri-
can Bankers Association, which sponsored a model statute codifying Armory, most states 
                                                          
15 See Langbein & Posner, supra note __, at 3-4. 
16 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 Yale L.J. 547, 567-568 (1964). 
17 See, e.g., King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) (restricting trust investment to government bonds and 
first mortgages, and forbidding investment in corporate securities).  
18 9 Pick. (26 Mass.) 446, 461 (1830).  
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repealed their legal lists and embraced the Armory prudent man rule by the mid-twentieth 
century.19    
In spite of the apparent flexibility of Amory’s open-ended prudent man formula-
tion, the rule became encrusted with a host of “specific subrules prescribing the types and 
characteristics of permissible investments for trustees.  Based on some degree of risk that 
was abstractly perceived as excessive, broad categories of investments and techniques 
often came to be classified as ‘speculative’ and thus as imprudent per se.”20  For example, 
the 1959 Restatement took the position that “[o]rdinarily it is proper for a trustee to invest 
in . . . bonds of the United States or of the State or of municipalities, in first mortgages on 
land, or in corporate bonds.”21  By contrast, investing in “speculative” stock (defined to 
include stock in any company other than one “with regular earnings and paying regular 
dividends which may reasonably be expected to continue”), buying securities on margin, 
or buying discounted bonds was presumptively improper.22   
Judicial review of the trustee’s investments operated ex post, inviting hindsight 
bias in the form of “post hoc searches for evidence that investments were too risky.”23  
Thus, if a higher risk investment did not pay off, the trustee faced potential liability for 
                                                          
19 See Langbein & Posner, supra note __, at 5; Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent 
Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 
499-504 (1951). 
20 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule, Introduction at 3-4 (1992).  
21 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §227 cmt. f (1959). 
22 Id. at cmts. f, m. 
23 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 Or. L. Rev. 
61, 79-80 (2000).  In re Chamberlain’s Estate, 156 A. 42, 43 (N.J. Prerog. 1931), is an egregious example:  
“It was common knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the general public as well, 
that the stock market condition [in August 1929] was an unhealthy one, that values were very much in-
flated, and that a crash was almost sure to occur.  In view of this fact, I think it was the duty of the execu-
tors to dispose of these stocks immediately upon their qualification as executors.”   
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imprudently “speculating” in stock.24  Worse still, under the old law courts assessed the 
prudence of each investment in isolation rather than in the context of the portfolio as a 
whole.  Hence, under the old law a “trust fund manager who increases the value of the 
trust principal while providing an ample return for the income recipients may find him-
self personally liable for the poor performance of a single security in the portfolio.”25 
Trust settlors sometimes tried to avoid the foregoing problems by specifically 
empowering the trustee to make a particular investment.  But even if the trust instrument 
gave the trustee such a power, the courts still assessed whether the trustee’s exercise of 
the power was prudent under the circumstances.26  Although a sound principle in the-
ory—the existence of a power does not speak to the prudence of its exercise—in practice 
judicial review of the trustee’s exercise of the power to make a particular investment was 
informed by the existing, constrained default rules.27  Likewise, neither an exculpation 
                                                          
24 See, e.g., First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 427 (Ala. 1982) (holding 
that investment in a set of underperforming stocks was imprudent “speculation” because the trustee had 
intended to sell them after appreciation).  See also Rachlinski, supra note __, at 79-81 (collecting cases).   
25 Roger D. Blair, ERISA and the Prudent Man Rule: Avoiding Perverse Results 68, in Lexeconics: 
The Interaction of Law and Economics 62-84 (Gerald Sirkin, ed., 1981). 
26 “An authorization by the terms of the trust to invest in a particular type of security does not mean 
that any investment in securities of that type is proper.”  Restatement (Second) of Trusts §227 cmt. v 
(1959).   
27 For example, in a well-known 1977 California decision, even though the trust instrument authorized 
every kind of investment “irrespective of whether said investments are in accordance with the laws then 
enforced in the State of California pertaining to the investment of trust funds,” the court held the trustees 
liable for breach of the prudent man rule, noting that the “defendants violated every applicable rule.”  
“While the declaration of trust may possibly enlarge the prudent-investor standard as far as the Type of 
investment is concerned,” explained the court, “it cannot be construed as permitting deviations from that 
standard in investigating the soundness of a specific investment.”  Estate of Collins, 139 Cal.Rptr. 644, 
646, 650 (App. 1977).  
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clause nor a grant of extended discretion could fully insulate the trustee from judicial re-
view.28    
In sum, under the old prudent man rule, the courts in effect deemed broad swaths 
of investments to be “safe” (and so presumptively prudent) or “speculative” (and so pre-
sumptively imprudent).  The courts also evaluated the prudence of each investment in 
isolation rather than in the context of the portfolio as a whole.  As such, “safe” invest-
ments in effect provided the trustee with a safe harbor from liability while having little 
effect on the trustee’s compensation (which, as discussed above, is generally based on the 
corpus of the trust).   
Not surprisingly, prior studies have found bank trust departments to be among the 
most conservative of institutional investors.  Based on SEC filings of institutional stock 
holdings prior to 1990, Del Guercio concluded that bank trust departments were the most 
conservative institutional investors.29  Although Del Guercio did not exploit differences 
in state laws (few states adopted the new prudent investor rule during the period of her 
study), she attributed bank trust departments’ relative conservatism to the prudent man 
rule.  Using SEC filings from 1983-1997, Bennet et al. also examined differences in asset 
allocations across institutional investors, likewise finding that bank trust departments in-
vested quite conservatively.30  Taking a different approach, but reaching a similar result, 
                                                          
28 For discussion of grants of extended discretion and exculpation clauses (with citations), see Jesse 
Dukeminier, Stanley M. Johanson, James Lindgren, & Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 540-43 
(7th ed. 2005). 
29 Diane Del Guercio, The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Invest-
ments, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 31 (1996).   
30 James A. Bennett, Richard W. Sias, and Laura T. Starks, Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dy-
namic Institutional Preferences, 16 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1203 (2003).  Both Del Guercio and Bennett et al. base 
their analyses on SEC filings that detail the institution’s aggregate investment profile, which likely includes 
both personal trusts and employee benefit funds.  As such, their data is less refined than ours.  See infra 
Section III.A. 
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in 1985 Longstreth surveyed the 50 largest bank trust departments, college and university 
endowments, private foundations, and corporate pension fund sponsors.31  Of the institu-
tions replying, bank trust departments reported being most constrained by the legal stan-
dards governing their investment practices. 
B. The Modern Prudent Investor Rule   
In the latter part of the twentieth century, scholars and sophisticated practitioners 
familiar with modern portfolio theory (MPT) began calling for reform of the prudent man 
rule.32  As the critics rightly noted, risk is correlated with return and unsystematic risk 
can be diversified away.  Assessing the prudence of a particular investment therefore re-
quires consideration of the portfolio as a whole, the beneficiary’s tolerance for risk, and 
the purpose of the trust.  Critics also noted that investment in long-term, fixed-rate obli-
gations with little default risk—the norm under the old prudent man rule—exposes the 
trust fund to considerable inflation risk.   
In response to the cogency of these criticisms, in the mid to late 1980s a handful 
of states repealed the old prudent man rule in favor of a new prudent investor rule consis-
tent with the teachings of MPT.  But widespread repeal of the old prudent man rule did 
not come until the early 1990s.  The deathblows to the old rule were two: (1) the 1992 
                                                          
31 Bevis Longstreth, Modern Trust Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule 232-66 (1986).  
A comparison of Longstreth’s findings with Begleiter’s results, discussed supra note 13, implies that trus-
tees feel substantially freer under prudent investor law than before, but the two surveys are from such dif-
ferent samples that a before-and-after comparison is inappropriate. 
32 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note __; Langbein & Posner, supra note __; John H. Langbein & Richard A. 
Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1; Longstreth, supra note 
__.  See also Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of 
Legal Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 721 (1976); Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 Harv. L. 
Rev. 603 (1970). 
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Restatement (Third) of Trusts sections on prudent investment (the Restatement) and (2) 
the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA).  As compared to other uniform laws and 
Restatements, the prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third) and Uniform Act has 
experienced an unusually swift and broad acceptance.  Today every state except Missis-
sippi has repealed the old prudent man rule in favor of the modern prudent investor rule.33   
As reformulated (and made gender-neutral), the new prudent investor rule pro-
vides that the “trustee’s investment and management decisions respecting individual as-
sets are evaluated not in isolation, but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and 
as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably 
suited to the trust.”34  The Restatement and UPIA also consolidated the duty to diversify 
into the definition of prudence.35   
In general, the new law applies prospectively to existing trusts.36  Thus, after 
adoption the new rule applies to all the trustee’s subsequent investment decisions, includ-
ing the failure within a “reasonable time” to reallocate a portfolio that was crafted to 
                                                          
33 We include within this category any statute based on the 1992 Restatement or the 1994 Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act, or that in comparable non-uniform or non-Restatement language instructs courts to 
evaluate the prudence of a particular investment in light of the composition of the portfolio as a whole.  
Table 5 details our dating of the modern prudent investor laws.  The language of the Uniform Act is a bit 
more precise than some of the earlier acts in that it expressly abolishes all categorical restrictions on in-
vestments, §2(e), and forbids hindsight review, §8.  
34 Uniform Prudent Investor Act §2 (1994) (hereinafter UPIA).  Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent 
Investor Rule §227(a) (1992) is to similar effect.  The reporters of the Restatement (Third) and UPIA have 
each published articles summarizing the new law.  See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in 
the Third Restatement, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1151 (1992); Langbein, supra note __. 
35 See UPIA§3; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule §227(b). 
36 See, e.g., UPIA §11.  The main exception is Pennsylvania, which excludes existing trusts from its 
new prudent investor rule.  See 20 Pa. Con. Stat. 7204(b).  Because the Pennsylvania statute was adopted 
after the period under study, we need not resolve whether to code it differently than the other adopting 
states.  In all adopting states behavior prior to adoption is governed by the prior law. 
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comply with the prior law.37  Indeed, we have been told that after local enactment of the 
new rule it was common for bank trust departments to undertake a systematic review of 
the investment profile of the bank’s existing book of business to assess each account’s 
compliance with the new law.38  On the other hand, compliance with the modern prudent 
investor rule will not always require a portfolio reallocation.  The risk tolerance of the 
beneficiaries may require a conservative investment strategy—visualize the paradigmatic 
trust for the benefit of a widow and orphans.39  Further, the new law does not require re-
allocation if the benefits of doing so are outweighed by the attendant tax and other trans-
action costs.40   
Accordingly, the extent to which adoption of the modern prudent investor rule 
prompts greater investment in equity will be a function of the risk tolerance of the benefi-
ciaries of the trusts in our sample, the transaction costs of portfolio reallocation and the 
meaning of “reasonable time,” and the extent to which settlors had previously been able 
successfully to opt out of the prior law. 
C. ERISA 
A further stimulus for reform, which was cited expressly by the drafters of the 
UPIA and the Restatement, was the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  
                                                          
37 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §229; UPIA §4.  We have been told that, after enactment of the new 
law, it was common for bank trust departments to undertake a systematic review of the bank’s trust ac-
counts  
38 [Check Fiduciary Institute book.] 
39 As the official comment to UPIA §2 explains, “tolerance for risk varies greatly with . . . the purposes 
of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries.  A trust whose main purpose is to support an 
elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young 
scion of great wealth.”    
40 See UPIA §4; Restatement (Third) of Trusts §229. 
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ERISA imposes on trustees of pension and employee benefit trusts a duty of prudent in-
vesting based on the Armory prudent man rule,41 but with four important changes.42  
First, the ERISA prudence rule omits the Armory language concerning “speculation” and 
the “probable safety of the capital.”  Second, the ERISA formulation focuses attention on 
“the circumstances then prevailing” (to avoid hindsight bias) and the “aims” of the “en-
terprise.”  Third, unlike the standard of prudence in private trust law, which is nominally 
a default rule, ERISA’s standard of prudent investing is mandatory.43  Fourth, and most 
important, in 1979 the Department of Labor issued a regulation that departed from the old 
prudent man rule by interpreting ERISA’s statement of prudence to require consideration 
of the role that each investment plays in the context of the portfolio as a whole.44  Consis-
tent with the Labor Department’s MPT-friendly interpretation, the federal courts have 
employed a total portfolio approach in ERISA litigation involving the prudence of indi-
vidual pension trust investments.45   
                                                          
41 ERISA §404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B). 
42 See Longstreth, supra note __, at 33-36. 
43 ERISA §404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(D).   
44 See 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i).  The official commentary to the regulation explains: “The 
‘prudence’ rule in the Act sets fort a standard built upon, but that should and does depart from, traditional 
trust law in certain respects.  The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a 
specific investment or investment course of action does not render such investment or investment course of 
action either per se prudent or per se imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not 
be judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action plays 
within the overall plan portfolio.”  44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, at 37,222 (Jun. 26, 1979).  
45 See, e.g., Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 
322 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court for reviewing the investment in question “in isolation under 
the common law trust standard, instead of according to the modern portfolio theory required by ERISA 
policy as expressed by the Secretary’s regulations”).  On the other hand, some scholars have argued that 
trustees operating under the ERISA standard of prudence nonetheless have invested cautiously in part be-
cause the large size of ERISA funds creates a significant liability exposure.  See Del Guercio, supra note 
__, at 36.  See also Longstreth, supra note __, at 35.  In a related vein, Brav and Heaton have argued that 
employee benefit funds tend to favor dividend-paying stocks, widely regarded as safer investments, and 
this may explain the relative underperformance of non-dividend paying stocks.  Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, 
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D. The Restatement  
As we have seen, the 1992 Restatement (Third) of Trusts was an important factor 
in prompting widespread adoption of the new prudent investor rule by state legislatures.  
In addition, courts have traditionally accorded substantial weight to the Restatements of 
Trusts.46  Therefore, the 1992 Restatement (Third) complicates our attempt to assess the 
impact of modern prudent investor statutes in three ways.47 
First, by validating MPT and clarifying legal issues through its extensive com-
mentary, the Restatement may have provided an important aid in interpreting the handful 
of MPT-friendly prudent investor statutes adopted prior to 1992.48  Second, like the rea-
sonable person standard in tort law, the understanding of prudence in trust law is in-
formed by “industry practice—what other trustees similarly situated [are] doing.”49  So 
the Restatement might have had an influence in states that were late to adopt the modern 
prudent investor rule by encouraging courts to gloss their state’s prudent man rule with 
MPT-style analysis.  Third, the Restatement might have influenced asset allocation in 
employee pension trusts, particularly if institutional trustees were cautious about relying 
exclusively on the Labor Department regulation until a body of validating case law arose.  
Although governed by ERISA’s federal standard of prudence, the new Restatement could 
influence the interpretation of that standard by federal courts.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Did ERISA’s Prudent Man Rule Change the Pricing of Dividend Omitting Firms?”  Working Paper 
(1998).  
46 See Langbein, supra note __, at 67 & n.3 (2001) (noting the pervasive influence of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, “which has long been the most authoritative source for American trust law”). 
47 Although released in 1992, the prudence provisions of the Restatement (Third) were approved by the 
American Law Institute at its 1990 annual meeting. 
48 On network effects and herd behavior in contract drafting, see sources cited in supra note 9.   
49 Langbein, supra note __, at 644. 
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III.   RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Data 
The trust data come from annual reports to federal banking authorities by feder-
ally-regulated financial institutions such as banks, savings and loan associations, and trust 
companies.  Federal law requires these institutions to report their trust holdings, including 
total trust assets, number of trust accounts, and the allocation of trust assets among 
stocks, bonds, and other investment vehicles.  The data are at the bank level; individual 
account data are not reported.  From 1968 until 2001, the Federal Financial Institutions 
Research Council published annual reports of trust holdings by regulated entities, sum-
marizing the results by state.50  Since 2001, the FDIC has published those reports and has 
made bank-level data available online.51  The FDIC provided us with a CD-ROM of 
bank-level data from 1986 to 2000.  Appendix Table 1 sets forth sample means and per-
cents for some key variables of interest.  
The trust holdings of regulated entities are reported in categories entitled “Em-
ployee Benefit Trusts,” “Personal Trusts,” and “Estates.”  The “Personal Trusts” category 
includes both private and charitable trusts,52 both inter vivos and testamentary, but ex-
                                                          
50 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Trust Assets of Financial Institutions, 1985-
2000. 
51 An interactive site allows one to obtain new data, state by state at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp.  Older reports, from 1996 through 2000, may be obtained at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/index.asp.  The banks report their holdings as of December 31 of the 
reporting year.  We therefore code all adoptions of Prudent Investor as taking place in the year the legisla-
tion took effect.  See infra Table 5. 
52 “In making investments of trust funds the trustee of a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that 
of the trustee of a private trust.”  Restatement (Second) of Trusts §389 (1959). 
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cludes commercial trusts and employee benefit plans.  The default rules governing Per-
sonal Trust administration were changed by the adoption of the prudent investor rule.  By 
contrast, the investment of Employee Benefit Trusts is not directly subject to state law, 
but rather to federal judicial and Labor Department interpretations of prudence under ER-
ISA.  Hence the asset allocation of Employee Benefit Trusts should be less sensitive to 
changes in state prudent investor laws.  Although state prudent investor laws may influ-
ence the interpretation of prudence under ERISA, they are not controlling authority in 
ERISA litigation.  In order to isolate the effect of changes in state prudent trust invest-
ment laws from contemporaneous trends in professional asset management, in some 
specifications we compare asset allocation in Personal Trusts with that in Employee 
Benefit Trusts.53 
The asset allocation of trust holdings is broken down among the following catego-
ries: (1) stock (common and preferred combined);54 (2) interest-bearing accounts; (3) 
U.S. treasuries; (4) local government bonds; (5) money-market funds; (6) other short-
term obligations (mainly commercial paper); (7) other bonds; (8) mortgages; (9) real es-
tate; and (10) miscellaneous.55  “Other bonds” includes corporate and foreign government 
                                                          
53 “Employee Benefits Trusts” is divided into two categories: (a) where the institution “exercises in-
vestment discretion in the capacity as trustee” and (2) where the bank is an “investment manager as defined 
in Section 3(38) of [ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(38)].”  We use only data reported in the first category, when 
the institution acts as trustee.  When the reporting institution operates as an “investment manager” instead 
of a trustee, its investment decisions are subject to direction from the trustee and the institution may be re-
sponsible for only a subset of the fund’s assets.  For example, a trustee might allocate a portion of the trust 
fund to bank A, directing A to invest its share of the fund entirely in stock, while allocating the rest of the 
fund to bank B, directing B to invest entirely in mortgages and bonds.  For a discussion, see In re Unisys 
Saving Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 439 (3d Cir. 1996).  
54 Shares of mutual funds are reported as stock holdings. 
55 A final category, “non-interest bearing accounts” was typically quite small (less than .1% on average 
and usually zero) and probably serves an accounting and beneficiary payment function. 
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obligations and “real estate” includes both investment in REITs and ownership of real 
property.   
Although the data are available from 1986 through 2004, we examine only the 
years 1986-1997 for three reasons.  First, beginning in 1997 the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 
made it much easier for banks and bank holding companies to convert independently 
chartered banks in other states into branch offices of a single interstate bank.56  But the 
data are collected by institution, not by state.  Interstate bank mergers or branch consoli-
dations thus have the potential to bias our results by changing the state in which assets are 
reported without a corresponding change in their governing law.  Prior to 1997, however, 
interstate banks tended to operate as bank holding companies with separately chartered 
(and hence separately reporting) banks in different states.57   
Second, after 1997 many states reformed their principal and income rules.  These 
reforms could affect trust asset allocation directly because they made less rigid the formal 
distinction between capital gains and income.58  Prior to 1997, principal and income rules 
had been uniform across the states.  
                                                          
56 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 
(2000)).  See also Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. Legis. 255 (1995).   
57 Banks could maintain interstate branches under narrow circumstances prior to 1997, but a study 
conducted by the Federal Reserve found that few banks did so.  See Susan McLaughlin, The Impact of In-
terstate Banking and Branching Reform: Evidence from the States, Current Issues in Economics and Fi-
nance, 1 (May 1995). 
58 Prior to the post-1997 principal and income reforms, the form of the investment return determined its 
classification as income or principal.  The problem with this approach is that trusts are commonly set up to 
pay income to one beneficiary for life (often a surviving spouse) and then the principal to another benefici-
ary (such as a surviving child) on the first beneficiary’s death.  See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent 
Investor Rule §227 cmt. i.  For example, suppose T bequeaths a fund to X in trust to pay the income to A for 
life and then the principal to B on A’s death.  If X invests in bonds or stocks that pay a cash dividend, under 
traditional law A is benefited because interest on bonds and cash dividends on common stock are classified 
as income.  By contrast, if X invests in stocks that do not pay a cash dividend, under traditional law B is 
benefited because stock appreciation is classified as principal.  Inasmuch as the trustee has a duty to act 
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Third, as a result of the jurisdictional competition for trust funds, state laws con-
cerning the Rule Against Perpetuities and self-settled asset protection trusts became sig-
nificantly differentiated beginning in 1997.59  Although these changes do not bear di-
rectly on trust investment law, they nonetheless have the potential to affect trust invest-
ment practice.  Perpetual trusts and self-settled asset protection trusts have a different 
timeframe and purpose that might warrant heavier investment in equities.60   
Figure 1 illustrates the geographic and temporal variation in the new law’s pattern 
of adoptions through 1997, the period under study.  As can be seen, there is a good 
amount of variation across regions and over time.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
impartially and with due regard to the needs of the income and principal beneficiaries, the principal and 
income rules thus bear directly on the trustee’s asset allocation.  For discussion, see Uniform Principal and 
Income Act Pref. Note & cmt. to §104 (1997); Alyssa A. Dirusso & Kathleen M. Sablone, Statutory Tech-
niques for Balancing the Financial Interests of Trust Beneficiaries, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 261, 274-88 (2005); 
Sitkoff, supra note __, at 652-54.   
59 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note __.  With the single exception of Delaware’s abolition of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities in 1995, all of these changes occurred in 1997 or later.  See id. at 430-33 (Ta-
ble 5).  
60 Regressions on the full sample tended to decrease the coefficient estimates a bit, but the results re-
mained statistically significant. 
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Figure 1: Prudent Investor Rule (1997)
 
Given the distribution of adoptions over time, if stock-preferring trusts changed 
states to take advantage of the new rule, our before-and-after analysis might yield biased 
estimates.  For at least three reasons, however, we think that this is unlikely.  First, it is 
difficult for an existing trust to change its situs without judicial approval.  Second, in con-
trast to perpetuities, asset protection, and taxes, there is no practitioner or other literature 
indicating that prudent trust investment laws influenced initial choice or subsequent 
change of jurisdiction.61  Third, in some specifications we test the effect of early versus 
later adoptions and find that later adoptions had a stronger effect, which implies no early 
movement by stock-preferring trusts. 
                                                          
61 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note __, at 378-79 n.71. 
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B. Identification Strategies 
 We focus on two dependent variables: (1) the percentage of actively managed 
personal trust funds invested in stock and (2) the difference between the percentage of 
personal trust funds held as stock and the percentage of employee benefit funds held as 
stock (hereinafter designated as %StockPT-%StockEB).     
The data do not detail individual stock, bond, and real estate holdings, but rather 
aggregate holdings within each category.  Percent stock holdings in personal trusts is, 
however, an important outcome variable in its own right for at least three reasons.62  First, 
the old prudent man rule disfavored broad classes of equity holdings.  Thus, if the prior 
law constrained trust portfolio asset allocation, we would expect to see reallocation to-
ward equity after adoption of the new law.  Second, the new law for the first time exposes 
the trustee to real litigation risk from too much caution.  Third, increased stock holdings 
at the expense of government bonds and other investments with little to no default risk 
imply higher risk portfolios.  Indeed, we show that the increase in stock holdings after 
adoption of the new law came largely at the expense of favored “safe” investments such 
as government bonds. 
We use both state- and bank-level data, each of which has pros and cons.  The 
bank-level data allow us to use institutional (or “high holder”) fixed effects to control for 
common management practices and institutional culture across separately charted institu-
tions of a single high holder, usually a bank holding company.  Some banks are not held 
by a holding company, in which case the bank is its own high holder.  Other banks are 
                                                          
62 Ideally, we would use Beta or some other measure of risk (such as variance of portfolio returns 
across different states), but such measures require individual account data, which is not available. 
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held by a holding company that is itself controlled by another holding company.  In cod-
ing for institutional fixed effects, we follow the Federal Reserve’s “high holder” designa-
tions. 
One problem with the bank-level data is that many banks have few assets in per-
sonal trust accounts.  In the period under study, 19% of bank-year observations for ac-
tively managed personal trust funds report no stock being held in such funds.  Much of 
this seemingly strange result is attributable to banks with few trust assets.  In the sample 
years 1986-1997, more than one-fourth of the bank-year observations report $1 million or 
less in actively managed personal trust assets, and 45% of this subset reports holding no 
stock in trust.  These small sums may represent only a few accounts, which can greatly 
distort the bank’s reported asset allocation.  Among banks with trust assets over $1 mil-
lion, only 7% of bank-year observations report no stock holdings.    
The large number of zero stock holdings is problematic for several reasons.  First, 
it creates a censoring problem that can bias OLS estimates (and fixes such as the Tobit 
random-effects regression raise other problems).  Second, because we are dealing with 
percentages, each bank’s reported asset allocation is weighted equally.  Hence substantial 
changes may be masked by small banks with one or two dominant trust funds that did not 
respond to the reform.  In a similar vein, small banks may have large swings that add a 
great deal of noise to the data.  
We address the foregoing problems with the bank-level data in four ways.   First, 
in some specifications, we weight the data by bank assets.  Second, we also examine 
state-level data.  Third, we limit the data in some bank-level regressions to those banks 
whose high holders also managed employee trusts.  In these subsamples, only 7 to 8% of 
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the bank-year observations report holding no stock, greatly reducing concerns about the 
data being censored at zero.  Importantly, limiting the data on these bases does not intro-
duce much selection.  In 1986, for example, excluding those trust institutions whose high 
holder did not have employee trust funds drops only $7 billion of the total $350 billion in 
reported trust assets.  Finally, in an appendix we include estimates of fixed and random 
effects linear probability models to assess whether banks were more likely to hold some 
of their trust assets in stock after the reform (see Appendix Table 2).  The results, which 
suggest that one to two percentage points more banks held stock after the adoption of the 
new prudent investor rule, are consistent with our other findings. 
Both the state-level and bank-level data allow for the use of fixed effects.  In the 
case of the state-level data, we simply include state dummies in the regression.  Thus, our 
state-level specification is a straightforward differences-in-differences regression: 
 
(1)%Stock Personaljt = αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + δPIjt + Ejt 
 
where j indexes state and t indexes year.  PI or Prudent Investor equals one after the state 
adopts the modern prudent investor rule.   
In the case of the bank-level data, we include fixed effects at the level of the “high 
holder” as designated by the Federal Reserve.  Sometimes there is no entity apart from 
the chartered institution (in which case the high-holder of the bank is itself).  However, 
most banks in the sample are wholly owned by a holding company.  Banks owned by the 
same high holder may share a common investment philosophy, operations manuals, and 
institutional culture.  On this view, Citibank of South Dakota would have much in com-
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mon with Citibank of New York—except insofar as the trusts held in South Dakota are 
subject to different state laws than those held in New York.  Using high holder fixed ef-
fects allows us to exploit the variation in state law while keeping management effects 
constant and while still including state-level fixed effects.  Thus, in the bank-level regres-
sions, the regression is a triple-difference: 
 
(2)%Stock Personalihjt = αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + δPIjt + Highholderhjt + Eihjt 
 
where i indexes bank and h indexes high holder.  HighHolder are bank holding company 
fixed effects.  In this regression the PI coefficient is identified by variation within bank 
holding companies that own reporting institutions in multiple states.  We thus simultane-
ously control for state and institution fixed effects. 
Because our dependent variable is a percentage, it varies between 0 and 100.  
There are two reasons why OLS regressions may not be ideal in this situation.  First, the 
fitted values of the regressions may lie outside that range, and it is not clear how to inter-
pret such a result.  In the state-level regressions, all fitted values for all regressions lie 
between 0 and 100 (in fact, they are generally between 25% and 75%).  In the bank-level 
regressions, however, a few of the fitted values were negative.63  Second, the linear form 
of the OLS regression imposes a functional form that must be incorrect.  The effect of a 
continuous right hand side variable tends to dissipate as it gets very large or very small 
because the effect must get smaller the closer the fitted value gets to the endpoints, 0 or 
                                                          
63 Out of a sample of nearly 23,000, between 100 and 150 fitted values were negative.  None exceeded 
100. 
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100.  Following the suggestion of Wooldridge and Papke,64 we exponentiate the right 
hand side.65  The downside of this non-linear approach is that interpretation of the log-
odds ratio is contingent on the values of the remaining variables.  Hence, because inter-
pretation of the OLS results is more straightforward, we report results for the OLS re-
gressions as well as the exponential transformations.  In addition, OLS regressions allow 
for random effects and AR(1) specifications, which we report in Appendix Table 3. 
We condition on two additional independent variables in most specifications: (1) 
log of the high holder’s assets and (2) percent of the high holder’s employee benefit 
funds invested in stock.  The first variable is positively correlated with stock investment 
in most specifications.  Banks with relatively greater aggregate trust assets may experi-
ence economies of scale in trading securities and in obtaining expert investment advice.  
We use log assets of the high holder because a small bank owned by a larger institution 
should be more like the large institution than a small, independent bank (although it made 
little difference to the results if we used log assets at the bank level).  In the correspond-
ing specifications for the state-level regressions, we use log total state assets.   
The second independent variable, percent of employee benefit funds invested in 
stock, helps to control for changes in institutional preferences for equity.  Institution fixed 
effects are inadequate to account for differences between institutions if preferences for 
                                                          
64 Leslie E. Papke & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Methods for Fractional Response Variables 
With an Application to 401(K) Plan Participation Rates, 11 J. Applied Econometrics 619 (1996).  The 
transformation requires estimation by non-linear least squares, and was performed using Stata’s GLM 
command taking the “family” as binomial and the “link” as logistic.  The estimation equation takes the 
form:   
   E(Y|X)=exp(X’B)/(1+exp(X’B)) 
which constrains the fitted values of Y to be between 0 and 1. 
65 Another popular transformation is the logistic.  This transformation is performed on the dependent 
variable, however, and there is no clear procedure for how to do this in the presence of zero values. 
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debt and equity changed within an institution over time or management was replaced.66  
Employee benefit trusts may be a suitable control.  First, the investment of such trusts is 
governed by federal prudent trust investment standards under ERISA, not state prudent 
investor laws.  Hence, the portfolio allocation of such trusts should be less sensitive than 
that of personal trusts to changes in state prudent trust investment laws.  Indeed, ERISA 
preempts inconsistent state law.  Second, changes in bank management or investment 
norms within the institution should affect personal trust and employee benefit trust funds 
similarly.  Accordingly, controlling for the institution’s or the state’s percentage holdings 
in stock in employee benefit funds may remove an important part of the error term.  As 
with institutional assets, we control for %StockEB on the high holder’s level on the theory 
that the preferences we are attempting to capture are those of the controlling institution.   
Employee benefit funds may also represent a valid control group.  The investment 
of such funds is governed by ERISA’s standard of prudence, and since at least 1979 pru-
dence under ERISA has been interpreted consistently with MPT.  On the other hand, even 
though ERISA contains an expansive preemption clause and state trust investment law is 
not directly controlling in ERISA cases, changes in state prudent trust investment laws 
and the new Restatement might have had an indirect impact on employee benefit fund 
investments.  First, changes in state law and the new Restatement could alter industry 
norms, and as a leading ERISA text explains, “ERISA’s prudent investor should be doing 
what other prudent investors are doing.”67  Second, federal courts sometimes look to or-
                                                          
66 To the extent that changing investment norms led to a general movement to stocks, such a trend 
would tend to work against our finding that the new prudent investor rule prompted an increase in trust 
investment in stock.   
67 John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 804 (3d ed. 2000). 
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dinary trust law authorities such as the Restatement for guidance in applying ERISA’s 
standard of prudence.68   
 With this in mind, we also take as a dependent variable %StockPT-%StockEB.  
This specification has a number of practical advantages.  First, in the bank-level specifi-
cations, it removes the zero value problem discussed earlier.  Second, although the values 
of the dependent variable are constrained to be between -100 and 100, all fitted values in 
all specifications are well within this range.  In addition, simply controlling for %StockEB 
as a right-hand side variable does not account for a divergence between the two variables 
over time.  As discussed in greater detail below, we find strong time trends in employee 
benefit portfolio allocations.  By contrast, taking the difference %StockPT-%StockEB con-
ditional on state and year dummies removes both (1) the strong time trends that were 
common to both variables (including the possible effect of the Restatement) and (2) state-
specific differences, and it does so without the addition of many new interaction terms.  
Indeed, taking the difference between the two should remove all fixed and time-varying 
error common to both variables.  In this specification the coefficient on PI is now inter-
preted as the change in the difference between the percentage stock in personal trust and 
employee benefit funds after adoption of the new law.  The result is thus similar to a first-
difference regression, assuming that asset allocation in employee benefit funds is an ap-
propriate control.  The specification takes the following triple-difference form in the 
state-level regressions:  
 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., California Ironworkers Field Pension Trust v. Loomis Sayles Co., 259 F.3d 1036, 1046-48 
(9th Cir. 2001) (looking to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts for guidance on calculating damages for im-
prudence). 
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(3)%StockPTjt-%StockEBjt= αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + δPIjt + Ejt 
 
In the bank-level regressions, the regression is a quadruple difference, reflecting 
the addition of high-holder fixed effects.  Because employee benefit funds are governed 
by ERISA, not state law, we use %StockEB at the highholder level on the theory that do-
ing so removes the component of the error term owing to institutional preferences for 
stock.69  This specification takes the following form: 
 
(4)%StockihjtPT-%StockhjtEB= αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + δPIjt + HighHolderhjt 
+ Eihjt 
IV.  RESULTS 
A. Percent Stock in Personal Trusts 
Figures 2 and 3 trace the percent stock (%Stock) and percent safe (%Safe) invest-
ments in personal trusts by reform status and year using the state-level data.  Consistent 
with the old prudent man rule, we define “safe” investments to include federal, state, and 
municipal bonds, interest-bearing bank accounts, money market funds, and mortgages.70  
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that trusts in the states that adopted the new pru-
dent investor rule held more stock (on the order of 1-4% depending on the year) at the 
expense of safe investments.   
                                                          
69 Even if the bank does not hold employee benefit funds, the highholder may through other banks.   
70 See supra note __ and text accompanying.  The remaining investment categories “other bonds,” “real 
estate,” and “short-term obligations,” varied substantially over the period and resist classification as “risky” 
or “safe.”  Investments in these categories typically amounted to less than 10% of the average portfolio. 
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Figure 2: Percentage Trust Funds Held as Stock 
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Figure 4 traces percent stock and percent safe investments in reform states before 
and after the adoption of the reform.  Both variables were detrended.71  As can be seen, 
the lines for stock and safe investments are almost perfect mirror-images, with what ap-
pears to be a movement from safe investments to stock after adoption of the new prudent 
investor rule.  By contrast, prior to the reform, the percentage of trust funds invested in 
each category were similar and remained relatively stable.  (Prior to the reform, stock 
composed 41% of the average reform state’s detrended aggregate portfolio and safe in-
vestments averaged 39%.)  After the reform, however, the two diverge almost immedi-
ately.  (Post-reform, stocks accounted for 47% of the average reform state’s detrended 
aggregate portfolio and safe investments averaged 34%.)  
Figure 4: Percentage Trust Funds Held as Stock and Safe 
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71 The variables were detrended by running a regression with only year dummies on the full sample 
(1986 through 1997), with 1986 being the excluded year, and then subtracting the year coefficients from 
the observed average in that year. 
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Tables 1 and 2 correspond to Equations 1 and 2, presenting the results for %Stock 
using state-level and bank-level data respectively.  Each table presents the basic model 
and a number of alternate specifications as checks for robustness and corrections for pos-
sible bias caused by serial correlation in the error terms.   
Table 1 demonstrates a consistent, statistically significant effect from adopting the 
new prudent investor rule.  In Model 1, the percentage of stock held in the average trust 
fund increases by 1.72 percentage points after the reform.  In Model 2, which further 
conditions on log total state assets and the percentage of assets held as stock in employee 
benefit funds, the coefficient on Prudent Investor increases slightly to 2.11 and is more 
precisely estimated.  To put these coefficients in perspective, in the period under study 
the average state held 47% of its personal trust assets in stock.   
Model 3 takes %Safe (with safe defined consistently with the old prudent man 
rule) as its dependent variable.  The coefficient on Prudent Investor (-2.02) has a similar 
magnitude as in Models 1 and 2, but is oppositely signed, which strongly implies that the 
increase in stock comes entirely at the expense of investments with little to no default 
risk, the sort of investments that the old prudent man rule had favored.  (Though unre-
ported here in the interests of space, this near one-for-one tradeoff persisted across speci-
fications.) 
Models 4 and 5 refine our specification of the reform variable.  In Model 4 we in-
teract Prudent Investor with a post-Restatement dummy variable, Restatement.  The coef-
ficient on Restatement*Prudent Investment is positive and of roughly the same magnitude 
as the Prudent Investor coefficient.  We cannot draw any firm conclusions, however, be-
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cause neither coefficient is independently significant (though the coefficients are jointly 
significant at less than the .01 level).72   
Model 5 divides the reform by those states that adopted the Uniform Prudent In-
vestor Act (UPIA) and those that adopted an independent statement of the new prudent 
investor rule (non-UPIA).  The effect of the UPIA is found to be much larger than the ef-
fect of other new prudent investor laws, and the coefficients jointly test significant with a 
p-value of .006.  We cannot conclude, however, that the Uniform Act had a more pro-
found effect on trust investment than the non-uniform modern prudent investor laws.  
First, we cannot reject the hypothesis that UPIA and non-UPIA are equal.  Second, the 
UPIA, which draws on the Restatement’s reformulation of prudence, was promulgated 
two years after the Restatement.  By contrast, most of the non-UPIA statutes were 
adopted prior to the promulgation of the Restatement.  As noted above, the Restatement 
may have had an independent positive effect, which would tend to depress the coefficient 
on non-UPIA and inflate the UPIA results. 
Model 6 weights the data by state-level total assets.  In doing so, we reduce the 
importance of the information coming from low-asset states and put the effect of the re-
form in national perspective.  The coefficient on Prudent Investor now is reduced by one 
                                                          
72 Taking the coefficients at face value, the results imply that the effect of the new prudent investor 
laws doubled after the Restatement was published.  Such an interpretation is consistent with the idea that 
the Restatement may have been important in validating the earlier adoptions of modern prudent investor 
laws, perhaps by giving modern portfolio theory added respect in the courts or by overcoming the lack of 
interpretive case law through its extensive commentary.  In addition, these results suggest that differences 
in stock holdings between reform and non-reform states increased after the Restatement was adopted, 
which means that we can still measure an independent effect of reform.  In other words, the publication of 
the Restatement did not move all trustees to the new equilibrium.  However, the Restatement may still have 
had an effect on non-reform states.  The Restatement may have induced greater investment in stock in the 
non-reform states, while at the same time validating the new statutes in the reform states.  The results are 
consistent with the validation effect being relatively larger.   
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half and is not significant at the .05 level (the p-value is .062).73  This result suggests that 
the reform had a greater effect in states with relatively fewer trust assets and a lesser ef-
fect in states with relatively more trust assets.  If we assume that a state’s total trust assets 
are correlated with the sophistication of the transferor, then this finding is consistent with 
the default nature of the reform.  The more sophisticated the parties, and the more that is 
at stake, the less important is the underlying default law.   
A potentially serious concern in differences-in-differences studies using state-
level panel data is the presence of serial correlation,74 particularly with financial variables 
(especially if investment patterns are persistent).  Standard tests for serial correlation 
suggest that serial correlation may be a problem,75 potentially biasing both our coefficient 
estimates and our standard errors.  We took several approaches to deal with the problem.  
Model 7 repeats the specification of Model 2, but relaxes the assumption of independence 
in error terms within states by clustering by state.  The standard error increases from .62 
to .86, but the coefficient remains significant with a p-value of .02.  Model 8 adds state-
specific time trends.  If the form of serial correlation is approximately linear within states, 
this specification should difference out the bias.  The coefficient on Prudent Investor de-
creases to 1.71 but remains significant at the 5% level.  (Also, when state-specific trends 
were included, standard tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.76)  
                                                          
73 In unreported regressions using Models 4 and 5 but weighting the data by state-level total assets, the 
coefficients of interest were jointly significant, though lower in magnitude than in the reported unweighted 
regressions.  
74 See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 
119 Q.J. Econ. 249 (2004). 
75 The Baltagi-Wu statistic was 1.45, whereas the null hypothesis of no serial correlation would be 
supported by a statistic of 2. 
76 The Baltagi-Wu Statistic was 1.97. 
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In Appendix Table 3, we report specifications based on random effects and the AR(1) 
form of serial correlation for all four regression equations.  The results are generally ro-
bust to either of these specifications.   
Model 9 presents the results using the exponential transformation of the right 
hand side variables.  The odds ratio on Prudent Investor is 1.094 and is significant at less 
than the 1% level, indicating that the percent of trust assets held as stock increased after 
the reform.  Taking 50% as a starting point (a rough estimate of our sample average), the 
odds ratio implies that stock holdings increased roughly 4.5 percentage points after re-
form, a slightly larger result than in our OLS estimates. 
Finally, we consider the year effects and the general increase in stock prices over 
the sample period.  All year coefficients are measured relative to 1986, the excluded year.  
In both the bank- and state-level regressions the year effects are relatively unimportant 
until 1992, except for 1988, the year following “Black Monday.”77  Beginning in 1992 in 
the bank-level regressions and 1994 in most of the state-level regressions, however, stock 
holdings begin a strong, positive trend upward.  Across datasets and specifications, stock 
holdings in 1997 are between 10 and 17 percentage points higher than in 1986, which 
suggests a strong secular move toward stock.  These trends may reflect a variety of 
changes over the 1990s.  Stocks greatly appreciated during the 1990s (for example, the 
S&P 500 index grew from in 330 points in 1990 to 975 points in 1997), so investment 
inertia would lead to an increase in the proportion of trust funds held in stock .  The 
trends may also reflect an increase in investor/trustee sophistication, a greater general tol-
                                                          
77 Indeed, it is surprising that the value stock holdings did not decline more than observed, as the S&P 
500 lost nearly a third of its value in 1987. 
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erance for risk among beneficiaries, and a more general move by institutional investors 
toward stock.    
The increase in percent stock caused by investor inertia and stock price apprecia-
tion has the potential to bias to our results upward if a state’s initial propensity to have 
high stock holdings is correlated with the policy change.78  There are, however, several 
reasons to think that our results are not biased upward in this manner.  First, Figures 2 
and 3 show that reform states were not radically different in initial stock holdings relative 
to non-reform states.  Second, Figure 4 (the detrended graph) shows no trend prior to 
adoption of the prudent investor rule.  Third, state effects, year effects, and state trends 
should remove the bias in most specifications.  (Moreover, adjusting the standard errors 
for serial correlation had little impact on the estimated standard errors.) 
Nevertheless, we subject our results to yet another robustness check.  Under three 
simplifying assumptions, we may remove the increase in percent stock attributable to 
stock market appreciation.  First, we assume that income in the form of interest and cash 
dividends is largely paid to out to the beneficiaries.  Because most trusts have a life bene-
ficiary and there are significant federal income tax incentives not to retain income in 
                                                          
78 Let us illustrate this concern with an extreme example.  Suppose State A holds 60% of its trust assets 
as stock and State B holds 20% of its trust assets as stock in year 0.  In year 1, stock values double and 
State A adopts the new prudent investor rule and State B does not.  If State A and B’s investments were 
static (i.e., income was paid out, non-stock investments did not change in value, and the portfolio allocation 
was not adjusted to reflect the increase in stock prices), then A would now hold 75% of its investments as 
stock and B would hold 33% of its investments as stock.  In such a scenario, our difference-in-difference 
estimate would erroneously yield a 2 percentage points increase following adoption of the new rule (State 
A having increased its stock holdings by 15 percentage points and State B by 13 percentage points).  For at 
least three reasons, however, this extreme example is unlikely to fit reality.  First, stock prices did not dou-
ble in one year.  Second, state and year dummies and state trends should remove many of these original 
differences.  Third, the mean percentage stock holdings in the sample was 52% with a standard deviation of 
13%, so the contrast between states was not generally so extreme. 
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trust,79 this is a realistic assumption.  Second, we assume that the value of all non-stock 
investments does not change.  This assumption will tend to exaggerate the effect of in-
creases in stock prices, because it does not account for the counter effect of increases in 
the value of other investments.80  Third, we assume that the increase in the average port-
folio is the same as the increase in the S&P 500.   
We then net out the increase in percentage stock that would result from static 
portfolio allocation.81  Model 10 presents the results taking “Net Percentage Stock” as the 
dependent variable.  The impact of the new prudent investor rule remains at roughly 2.0 
percentage points.  Thus, our previous results hold even with our rough and undoubtedly 
noisy method of removing appreciation bias.  In addition, the year effects, as expected, 
diminish and do not indicate a trend (the year effect for 1997 is indistinguishable from 
1987, the excluded year).  In sum, our previous estimates are little changed when we ac-
count for investment inertia. 
Table 2 presents the results using the specification of Equation 2.  All standard er-
rors reflect clustering by state.  Model 1 uses the full sample.  The coefficient on Prudent 
Investor is small and insignificant, and the estimated coefficient on Prudent Investor is 
very close to zero.  In Model 2, which restricts the sample to banks that also report em-
ployee benefit funds and controls for %StockEB, the coefficient on Prudent Investor in-
creases to .9, but is still not statistically significant.  Likewise, weighting increases the 
                                                          
79 See William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Wills, Trusts and Estates §15.5 at 705 (3d ed. 
2004). 
80 For example, bond prices increased over the course of the 1990s.  
81 Letting ∆SP=(S&Pt-S&Pt-1)/S&Pt-1, we net out the increase in stock prices as follows: 
 %StockNett=%Stockt-[∆SP*%Stockt-1/(1+∆SP*%Stockt-1)]  
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coefficient a bit more in Model 3, though again it is not statistically significant.82  The 
results are statistically significant when state-specific trends are included in the OLS re-
gression in Model 4 and in the transformation in Model 5.  The odds-ratio in Model 5 is 
1.076, which is quite close to that of the state-level result of 1.094, and implies a roughly 
3.5 percentage points increase in stock holdings as a result of the reform assuming a fitted 
value of roughly 50% stock holdings. 
In sum, the state-level OLS regressions suggest that the percentage of personal 
trust funds invested in stock increased between 1.5 and 2.1 percentage points after adop-
tion of the new prudent investor rule.  The transformed results imply a 3.5 to 4.5 percent-
age points increase in stock holdings after the reform.  In the period under study, the av-
erage state held 47% of its personal trust assets in stock.  Accordingly, these results sug-
gest a modest increase in trust investment in stock post-reform.  The bank-level results 
are weaker in some OLS specifications, but the effect of reform is evident when state-
specific time trends are used and when the data are transformed.   
  
B. Percent Stock in Personal Trust Funds Minus Percent Stock in Employee 
Benefit Funds (%StockPT-%StockEB) 
Given the strong time trends evident in the Percent Stock specification, examining 
%StockPT-%StockEB becomes more important.  Changes in industry and institutional in-
vestment norms should affect personal trusts and employee benefit trusts similarly.  If so, 
                                                          
82 Unreported regressions restricting the sample to larger banks or only banks with employee benefit 
funds yielded results close to those of Model 1.  The coefficient increases appreciably only when we condi-
tion on %StockEB. 
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this specification removes the variation in stock ownership that came from changing in-
dustry and institutional norms to the extent that they arose independent of the changes in 
state prudent trust investment laws.  
Using the state-level data, Figures 5 and 6 trace %StockPT-%StockEB by year (Fig-
ure 5) and by years before and after adoption of the new prudent investor rule (Figure 6).  
Unlike Figure 2, which showed a consistent difference in the stock holdings of personal 
trusts between reform and non-reform states, Figure 5 does not show a consistent differ-
ence between %StockPT-%StockEB in reform versus non-reform states.  Figure 6 traces 
%StockPT-%StockEB (detrended) in reform states before and after the adoption of the re-
form.  The graph here suggests that stock holdings in employee benefit funds grew rela-
tive to personal trusts prior to reform, but the trend reversed after the reform.  This rever-
sal suggests a relative increase in stock holdings in personal trusts after the reform.   
Figure 5: %StockPT – %StockEB


































  Draft of May 19, 2006 
 
 - 39 -
Figure 6: %StockPT – %StockEB






0 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Years Pre- and Post-Reform
 
Table 3 presents the state-level results for the specification presented in Equation 
3.  The estimated effect of Prudent Investor in Model 1 is 4.34 percentage points, roughly 
twice as large as the estimate from the same specification in Table 1.  Weighting the data 
(Model 4) or controlling for state trends (Model 6) reduces the estimated coefficient by 
about one-third, but it remains statistically significant.  Clustering by state has only a 
small effect on the calculation of the error term (Model 5).  In sum, the state-level regres-
sions suggest that the difference between the percentage of stock holdings in personal 
trust funds and employee benefit funds was 3 to 4 points larger after adoption of the new 
prudent investor rule.83   
                                                          
83 To put these results in context, in 1986 personal trusts in the average state held 4 percentage points 
more in stock than was held in employee benefit funds (42% versus 38%).  We interpret the coefficient of 
4.3 on Prudent Investor and the coefficient of roughly -5.5 on the later year dummies to imply that the dif-
ferential remained nearly constant in states that adopted the new prudent investor rule but disappeared in 
states that did not adopt the reform.  These results are consistent with the trends depicted in Figure 6. 
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The bank-level regressions reported in Table 4 tell roughly the same story and, 
unlike before, largely confirm the state-level estimates.  When the data are weighted by 
bank assets in Model 4, the coefficient on Prudent Investor is 4.45 (with a p-value of 
.059).  This result is nearly identical to the coefficient of 4.34 estimated in Model 1 of 
Table 3, and it is not greatly different from the coefficient of 2.88 estimated using data 
weighted by state assets in Model 4 of Table 3.  In the remaining Models of Table 4, the 
coefficients on Prudent Investor are between one-half and two-thirds of their correspond-
ing estimates in Table 4, but are statistically significant across specifications.84  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The results of our empirical analysis demonstrate that changes in the default rules 
of prudent trust investing affected portfolio allocation in noncommercial trusts held by 
institutional trustees.  Depending on the approach taken, the point estimates imply that 
stock holdings increased between 1.5 and 4.5 percentage points—an increase of 3 to 10 
percent—after the adoption of the new prudent investor rule.  This result endures across a 
variety of identification strategies and numerous robustness checks.    
Assuming that 2 percentage points more of personal trust funds were invested in 
stock as of 1997, a year when reported personal trust assets totaled nearly $750 billion, 
roughly $15 billion more was invested in stock than otherwise would have been.  This 
result is even more impressive when one considers that (a) for many trusts the new law 
                                                          
84 The bank-level data employed here do not carry the same censoring problems as in the %Stock 
specifications of Table 1.  However, the sample is selected on only those banks whose high holder also 
manage employee benefit trusts, and must be interpreted as such (though we hasten to add that this selec-
tion eliminates only a small fraction of total personal trust assets).   
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will not require a reallocation (the inframarginal trusts) and (b) the new law only requires 
the trustee of a non-complying trust to reallocate the trust portfolio within a “reasonable 
time” bearing in mind the tax and other transaction costs of reallocation.  Hence, that 
there is any observable effect implies that the default rules of trust investment law, and 
the switch to the modern prudent investor standard, has had a profound influence 
Further, because our data includes only a subset of the full population of trust 
funds, this $15 billion back-of-the-envelope calculation represents a lower bound.  In-
deed, there is good reason to suppose that trust funds held by federally-reporting institu-
tional trustees are less sensitive to changes in the default rules of prudent trust investing 
than other trusts.  Institutional trustees tend to have access to competent legal counsel and 
standard form trust agreements with well-drafted opt-out provisions.   
The year effects show that secular trends since 1992 pushed more trust assets into 
stock investment than did adoption of the prudent investor rule.  In the state-level regres-
sions, stock holdings in 1997 are about 12 percentage points higher than in 1986.  We 
interpret these results to mean that reform of the prudent investor laws was one compo-
nent of a larger phenomenon.   
The timing of the upward trend in stock holdings suggests that the 1992 Restate-
ment may also have had an effect on trust investment, and the Restatement was part of 
the movement toward the MPT-friendly prudent investor rule.  Prudence is a relative 
standard that is established in part by “what other trustees similarly situated [are] do-
ing.”85  On the other hand, ERISA-governed employee benefit funds exhibited even 
greater relative increases in stockholdings over the same period, catching up with and 
                                                          
85 Langbein, supra note __, at 644. 
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even surpassing personal trusts.  In theory, ERISA-governed funds should have been less 
affected by the new Restatement because prior federal regulations had already adopted an 
MPT-friendly interpretation of prudence under ERISA.  Accordingly, we hesitate to con-
clude that the Restatement, by itself, had an observable effect on trust asset allocation.  
Our findings have at least six important policy implications.  First, increasing trust 
investment in stocks supports the Restatement’s and UPIA’s allied reform of consolidat-
ing the duty to diversify into the definition of prudence.86  Not all the states that have 
adopted the total-portfolio approach of the new prudent investor rule, however, have 
adopted an explicit duty to diversify.  Second, the growing importance of stocks, caused 
in part by legal changes, lends support to the current effort to reform the principal and 
income rules by making less rigid the arcane formal distinction between capital gains and 
income.87   
Third, the increasing role of stock investment supports a total return measure of 
damages for breach of trust.  The total return measure is based on the difference in value 
between the imprudently managed trust and a hypothetical, prudent portfolio.  The tradi-
tional approach, by contrast, is to measure damages by reference to the amount of the 
trust fund on the date that it was last prudently invested plus interest (sometimes but not 
always compounded) at a rate set by the trial court.88  Because the average trust fund to-
day comprises 60% stock, and stock returns exhibit greater variance than bond returns, 
                                                          
86 See supra note __ and text accompanying.   
87 For discussion of the principal and income problem, see supra note __ and text accompanying.  
88 See Dukeminier et al., supra note __, at 817-88. 
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the total return measure more closely fits the underlying remedial aim of putting the 
beneficiaries in the position that they would have been in but for the breach.89  
Fourth, the results demonstrate that default rules matter in the presence of agency 
costs and unreliable judicial enforcement of opt outs.  The importance of this conclusion 
is brought more sharply into focus when one considers that the federally-reporting institu-
tional trustees in our sample are likely among the most sophisticated of trustees (in 2004 
the average account size in our sample was $1 million), with ready access to competent 
legal counsel and trust agreement forms with well-drafted opt-out boilerplate.  Nonethe-
less, even for this group, the default rule remained relevant.   
Fifth, contrary to economic and empirical analysis of fiduciary litigation in corpo-
rate law,90 but consistent with prior economic analysis of fiduciary litigation in trust 
law,91 our results imply that fiduciary law is a potentially viable means of governance in 
trust law—and the threat of fiduciary litigation is the primary force for minimizing 
agency costs in the modern trust relationship.  Prior to this study, however, there was no 
empirical analysis of whether trustees are in fact sensitive to changes in their potential 
liability exposure under trust fiduciary law. 
Finally, we believe that adoption of the new prudent investor rule  was a positive 
change for settlors, trustees, beneficiaries.  The agency problems in trust law, together 
with trustee compensation schemes, rigid doctrine, and hindsight bias, combined to make 
                                                          
89 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule §205 (1992); Halbach, supra note __, at 
458-59; Sitkoff, supra note __, at 584-87. 
90 See, e.g. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. 55 
(1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 93-102 
(1991). 
91 See Sitkoff, supra note __, at 677-83; Sitkoff, supra note __, at 577-78, 580-81. 
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bank trust departments notoriously conservative.  Although heavy investment in govern-
ment bonds avoids default risk, it exposes the trust to considerable inflation risk.  By con-
trast, the new rule’s emphasis on portfolio-wide risk and return frees trustees to invest 
more aggressively for those who have a high risk tolerance, directs trustees to invest 
more conservatively for those with a low risk tolerance, and in all cases the trustee must 
consider both default and inflation risk in crafting the trust portfolio.  
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TABLE 1: STATE-LEVEL RESULTS FOR PERSONAL TRUST ACCOUNTS 


















































   1.42+ 
 (.85) 
      
UPIA     3.10** 
 (1.23) 
     
non-UPIA     1.65* 
 (.65) 
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Joint Test PI, Re-
state*PI 
   .0024       
Joint Test UPIA, non-
UPIA 
      .006       
R-Square .8965 .9166 .8050 .9170 .9169 .9110 .9166 .9526 N/A .8915 
N=600 state-year observations (550 in Model 10).   **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.   Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  All regressions include state 
dummies and a constant.  Model 6 uses inflation-adjusted total state assets as sample weights.    
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art45
  Draft of May 19, 2006 
 
 - 51 -
 
TABLE 2: BANK-LEVEL RESULTS FOR PERCENT STOCK 
Variable Model 1 
Full Sample 
 
Model 2 Model 3 
Weighted 
  
Model 4  



















      .022** 
 (.004) 






% Stocks Employee 































































































































R-Square .2546 .3338 .7667 .3342 N/A 
N 24,424 22,885 22,885  22,885  22,885 
**sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.    All regressions include state dummies, bank holding 
company fixed effects, and a constant.  The standard errors are Huber-White robust and reflect clustering on the 
state level.  Model 3 uses inflation-adjusted total bank assets as sample weights.    
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  Draft of May 19, 2006 
 
 - 52 -
 
 
TABLE 3: STATE-LEVEL RESULTS FOR %STOCKPT-%STOCKEB 























Restatement*PI  4.41** 
 (1.81) 
    
UPIA   4.37+ 
 (2.45) 
   
Non-UPIA   4.34** 
 (1.33) 
   


























































































































































Joint Test PI, Restate*PI  .0003     
Joint Test UPIA, non-
UPIA 
   .0036    
R-Square .9170 .9174 . 9174 .9331 .9170 .9529 
N=600 state-year observations.   **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.   Huber-White robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  All regressions include state dummies and a constant.  Model 4 uses inflation-adjusted total state assets as sample 
weights.    
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 TABLE 4: BANK-LEVEL RESULTS FOR %STOCKPT-%STOCKEB 


















Restatement*PI  1.42 
 (1.17) 
   
UPIA   1.99** 
 (.60) 
  
Non-UPIA   3.05* 
 (1.46) 
  


































































































































Joint Test PI, Re-
state*PI 
 .0002      
Joint Test UPIA, 
Non-UPIA 
  .001   
R-Square .0504 .0504 .0505 .6754 .0587 
N=22,885 state-year observations.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.   All regressions 
include state dummies, bank holding company fixed effects, and a constant.  The standard errors of all models are 
Huber-White robust and reflect clustering on the state level.   Model 4 uses inflation-adjusted total bank assets as 
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TABLE 5: 




Alabama 1989  
Alaska  1998 
Arizona  1996 
Arkansas  1997 
California 1987 1996 
Colorado  1995 
Connecticut  1997 
Delaware 1986  
Florida 1993  
Georgia 1988  
Hawaii  1997 
Idaho  1997 
Illinois 1992  
Indiana  1999 
Iowa 1991 2000 
Kansas 1993 2000 
Kentucky 199694  
Louisiana  2001 
Maine  1997 
Maryland 1994  
Massachusetts  1999 
Michigan  2000 
Minnesota 1986 1997 
Mississippi   
Missouri  1996 
Montana 1989 2003 
Nebraska  1997 
Nevada 1989 2003 
New Hampshire  1999 
                                                          
92 We include in this category any statute based on the 1992 Restatement or that in comparable non-
Restatement language instructs courts to evaluate the prudence of a particular investment in light of the 
composition of the portfolio as a whole. 
93 We include in this category any statute based on the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act. 
94 The Kentucky MPT-style prudent investor legislation applies only to institutional trustees.  Ky. Stat. 
§287.277(1).  Effective January 1, 2005, other trustees may seek court approval to be governed by this stat-
ute.  Ky. Stat. §386.454.  Other trustees who do not avail themselves of §386.454 are governed by a legal 
list.  Ky. Stat. §386.020. 
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New Jersey  1997 
New Mexico  1995 
New York 1995  
North Carolina  2000 
North Dakota  1997 
Ohio  1999 
Oklahoma  1995 
Oregon  1995 
Pennsylvania  199995 
Rhode Island  1996 
South Carolina 1990 2001 
South Dakota 1995  
Tennessee 1989 2002 
Texas 1992 2004 
Utah  1995 
Vermont  1998 
Virginia 1992 2000 
Washington 1985  
West Virginia  1996 
Wisconsin  200496 
Wyoming  1999 
Current as of Lexis or Westlaw in August 2005. 
                                                          
95 Although Pennsylvania’s statute deviates quite substantially from the UPIA, we need not resolve 
whether those deviations require a coding Pennsylvania differently, as the Pennsylvania statute was enacted 
after the period under study.  See supra note __. 
96 Prior to April 30, 2004, Wisconsin not only followed the constrained prudent man rule, but it also 
capped investments in common stocks at 50 percent of the total market value of the fund.  See Wisc. Stat. 
§881.01 (2003). 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1 sets forth sample means and percents for some key variables of 
interest. 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: 
SAMPLE MEANS AND PERCENTS 
Variable Mean/Percent 
Bank Personal Trust Assets*  $175 Million 
(987) 
Bank Employee Benefit Assets* $263 Million 
(1,125) 
Banks with Highholder 85% 






 %Stock 54.0% 
 %Safe 33.1% 
 %Other 12.9% 
 
Employee Benefit  
 
 %Stock 46.3% 
 %Safe 33.9% 
 %Other 19.8% 
Means and proportions are based on data from 1986 to 1997 at the bank 
level.  Standard deviation in parentheses where applicable.  “Highholder” 
follows Federal Reserve institutional owner designations, usually a bank 
holding company.  “Safe” investments to include federal, state, and mu-
nicipal bonds, interest-bearing bank accounts, money market funds, and 
mortgages. 
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Appendix Table 2 reports results for linear probability models.  The results uni-
formly suggest that the propensity for banks to invest some trust assets in stock increased 
after the adoption of the new prudent investor law.  Because almost all of our control 
variables, including our variable of interest, are dummy variables, linear probability mod-
els are easily justified and computationally tractable.  The interpretation of the coefficient 
on Prudent Investor is simply the increase in the proportion of banks holding stock after 
the reform. 
 Our fixed effects specification relies on variation within holding companies across 
states.  The identifying variation comes from multi-state high holders, which might be 
fairly restrictive in this case given that the vast majority of large banks own stock.  We 
therefore include random effects specifications as well (which permits identifying varia-
tion to come from banks without a multi-state high holder).  The results are surprisingly 
similar. 
 Models 1 and 2 employ the full sample.  In Model 1, which uses random effects, 
1.3 percentage points more banks hold stock after the reform and the result is significant 
at the 5% level.  Model 2’s fixed effects specification yields the roughly the same result, 
but is significant at barely the 10% level.  Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to banks with 
$1 million or more in trust holdings, and the magnitude of the estimated effect is similar 
to Models 1 and 2 but is now more precisely estimated.  Models 5 and 6 condition on 
percent stock held in employee benefit funds (which further limits the sample), and the 
estimated effect increases to about 2 percentage points and is now significant that the 1% 
level.  The addition of state-specific time trends makes little difference in Model 7. 
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 Appendix Table 3 reports results for random effects and AR(1) specifications.  
These specifications are intended to test the robustness of the results to the presence of 
serial correlation.  The AR(1) specification allows panel autocorrelation with a one-
period lag, and the random effects estimation is consistent in the presence of serial corre-
lation (though the standard errors may be understated).  The AR(1) specification reduces 
the size of the Prudent Investor coefficient by roughly half, but it remains statistically 
significant.  The random effects estimation is nearly the same as the corresponding fixed 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2:  RESULTS FOR LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS  
(STOCK OWNERSHIP OBSERVED = 1) 
 





















Prudent Investor .013* .012+ .011* .011* .021** .020** .014* 
 (.006) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Log Total High  .092** .095** .027** .036** .057** .063** .064** 
Holder Assets (.006) (.007) (.004) (.011) (.008) (.013) (.014)  
% Stocks Employee      .067** .063** .065** 
Benefit Funds (HH)     (.011) (.013) (.013) 
1987 .002 .003 .002 .004 .005 .006 .011* 
 (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
1988 -.010* -.008+ -.008+ -.006 -.004 -.003 .006 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
1989 -.013** -.012** -.002 -.001 -.002 -.003 .010** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
1990 -.005 -.005 .005 .006 .007+ .007 .024** 
 (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
1991 -.007 -.007 .008 .007 .001 -.000 .022** 
 (.006) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
1992 -.016* -.017* .000 -.001 -.009* -.012* .016** 
 (.007) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
1993 -.012+ -.013+ .004 .001 -.014** -.017** .015** 
 (.007) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) 
1994 -.006 -.007 .006 .004 -.011* -.015** .022** 
 (.007) (.008) (.006) (.007) (.004) (.005) (.007) 
1995 -.015* -.016* -.004 -.007 -.026** -.030** .011* 
 (.006) (.007) (.006) (.009) (.006) (.008) (.005) 
1996 -.022** -.024* -.002 -.007 -.034** -.039** .007 
 (.008) (.010) (.006) (.009) (.006) (.008) (.005) 
1997 -.024* -.026* -.002 -.009 -.043** -.050** .001 
 (.010) (.013) (.006) (.009) (.007) (.010) (.001) 
Proportion of 
















N 32,801 32,801 26,420 26,420 22,884 22,884 22,884 
**sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.   All regressions include state dummies. Fixed effects models employ bank holding company 
fixed effects.  The standard errors of all models are Huber-White robust and reflect clustering on the state level except that of Model 7.    
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APPENDIX TABLE 3: AR(1) AND RANDOM EFFECTS 
 %STOCK %StockPT-%StockEB 






















































































































































































































































N 600 22,885 600 20,100 22,885 22,885 22,885 20,100 
**sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level, +sig. at <.10 level.   Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  All models include state fixed effects except Models 1 and 5.  AR(1) bank level 
models 4 and 8 use bank fixed effects instead of highholder fixed effects because the AR(1) identification requires 1 observation per panel period.    
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